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Abstract 
This paper attempts to dissect the effect of the immunity granted to MINUSCA and 
MONUSCO peacekeeping military personnel on their accountability (or lack thereof) for the 
abuse of civilians contrary to their duty to protect the said civilians. It is argued that accounta-
bility, because of its deterrent effect, is necessary to prevent the abuse of civilians by peace-
keeping military personnel and thus is a necessary condition for the achievement of the man-
date of the peacekeeping missions in light of the human security concept. As such, this paper 
analyses the extent to which the lack of accountability for the abuse of civilians by peacekeep-
ing soldiers is as a result of the immunity granted to them and in light of this, interrogates this 
immunity. It does so by analysing the cases of abuse of civilians by the peacekeeping soldiers 
and the relationship between the accountability (and lack thereof) for such acts and the immun-
ity granted to the peacekeeping military personnel. In light of this, it is concluded that the 
immunity granted to peacekeeping soldiers negatively affects their accountability for the abuse 
of civilians to the extent that (i) it subjects the investigation to the legal systems of the troop 
contributing countries, which are often inadequate, (ii) it compromises the collection of evi-
dence, and (iii) it compromises the impartiality of the process. It is also established that this 
immunity is indispensable to the UN peacekeeping model and thus it cannot be waived. There-
fore, it is recommended that any measures taken to foster accountability of the soldiers for 
abuse of civilians cannot include the waiver of the immunity. Instead, any such measure must 
examine and address the 3 factors that make immunity problematic in holding peacekeeping 
soldiers accountable for abuse of civilians. 
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1 Chapter One: Introduction 
1.1 Background of the problem 
The maintenance of international peace and security is one of the main purposes of the United 
Nations (UN). 1 Many of the activities of the UN are geared towards this end, especially those 
of the Security Council. The Security Council is mandated with taking measures- including the 
use of force- for the restoration and maintenance of international peace and security. 2 One such 
measure is the deployment of military forces in conflict areas in order to ensure the cessation 
of hostilities, often referred to as UN peacekeeping.3 Though peacekeeping is not directly en-
visaged by the UN charter, it has been used numerously to restore peace and often the mission 
is mandated with the protection of civilians. 4 The concept of peacekeeping can be traced back 
to the 5th century BC but its surest precedent is the deployment of troops by the League of 
Nations in Germany to preserve law and order during the Saar status referendum.5 
UN peacekeeping operations are authorised by the Security Council with the consent of the 
host state.6 The miiitary forces deployed are composed of troops contributed by member states 
known as Troop contributing countries (TCC) and the fmancial burden of the operations is 
borne by the international community. 7 For purposes of obtaining these troops, the UN acts as 
an intermediary between the TCC and the host state by contracting with each party separately. 
The agreement betWeen the UN and the TCC governs the terms under which the Tee· agrees 
to contribute its soldiers, such as compensation and takes the form of a memorandum of un-
derstanding. 8 The agreement between the UN and the host state is called a status of forces 
agreement (SOFA) and is an undertaking by the host state to cooperate with the peacekeeping 
forces. All SOFA's must follow a model adopted by the UN General Assembly that sets out 
1 Article 1, Charterofthe United Nations, 24 October 1945. 
2 Article 42, Charter of the United Nations. 
3 Bellamy A and Williams P, Understanding Peacekeeping, 2"ded, Polity, London, 2010. 
4 Lewis P, 'A short history of United Nations Peacekeeping' HistoryNet 18 August 2017 <http://www.histo-
rynet.com/short-history-united-nations-peacekeeping.htm >on 23 November 2017. 
5 Lewis P, 'A short History of United Nations Peacekeeping' HistoryNet, 18 August 2017 <http://www.histo-
rynet.com/short-history-united-nations-peacekeeping.htm > on 23 November 2017. 
6 <http://peacekeeping.un.org/en/what-is-peacekeeping> on 23 November 2017. 
7 <http://peacekeeping.un.org/en/what-is-peacekeeping> on 23 November 2017. 
8 Code Blue Campaign, Privileges and immunities of the United Nations, 13 May 2015, 1-3. 
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mandatory provisions such as the immunity of the peacekeeping military personnel from the 
criminal justification of the host state and exclusive jurisdiction of the TCC over their soldiers. 9 
Since the first UN peacekeeping forces were deployed in 1956, the number of UN peacekeep-
ing operations has exponentially increased.10 There are currently over 10 on-going UN peace-
keeping operations. 11 Despite the role of UN peacekeeping in the restoration of peace in areas 
like Namibia and Cambodia, UN peacekeeping has been heavily criticised for its alleged futil-
ity.12 UN peacekeeping has been especially criticised for its weakness and failure to protect 
fundamental human rights even where the mandate of the mission is to protect civilians. 13 For 
instance, many peacekeeping soldiers have been accused of sexually abusing the civilians they 
were mandated to protect. 14 
1.2 Statement of the problem 
According to the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS), 480 cases of sexual abuse of 
civilians by peacekeeping staff were reported between 2008 and 2013 .15 Majority of these 
abuses occurred in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DR C) and the Central African Republic 
(CAR)16 where there are ongoing UN peacekeeping missions: The United Nations Organiza-
tion Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO) and the United 
Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic 
(MINUSCA) respectively. These missions have the primary mandate of protecting civilians 
from the use of force 17 but the soldiers responsible for the abuse of civilians largely go unpun-
ished. 18 The lack of accountability with which these allegations have been treated has caused a 
9 UNGA, Comprehensive Review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects: Model 
status- of- forces agreement, UN N451594 (9 October 1990). 
10 < http://www.un.org/enlpeacekeeping/> on 8 November. 
11 < http://www.un.org/enlpeacekeeping/> on 8 November. 
12 Roberts A, 'The crisis in UN peacekeeping' Cycle of Conferences by foreign individuals delivered within the 
scope of the National Defense Course organised by the Instituto da Defeca Nacional, Lisbon, 20 April 1994, 131. 
13 Akonor K, UN Peacekeeping in Africa: A Critical Examination and Recommendations for Improvement, 1" ed, 
Springer, London, 2016, 10. 
14 Akonor, UN Peacekeeping in Africa, 25 
15 Evaluation of the Enforcement and Remedial Assistance Efforts for Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by the United 
Nations and Related Personnel in Peacekeeping Operations, OIOS Evaluation Report, 12 June 2015, 8-9. 
16 Peacekeeping initiatives in action: addressing Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, UN Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations Report, March 2017, 1. 
17 UNSC S/RES/1925 (2010) The establishment ofMONUSCO and UNSC SIRES/ 2149 (2014) The establish-
ment ofMINUSCA. 
18 Morenne 8, ' No Charges in Sexual Abuse Case Involving French Peacekeepers ' The New York Times (2017) . 
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lot of back-lash and many have attributed it to the immunity granted to the peacekeeping sol-
diers. 19The immunity granted to the MONUSCO and MINUSCA soldiers has allegedly ena-
bled them to escape liability for using force against civilians which is in breach of their duty to 
protect civilians under the mandate of their respective missions. 
The immunity is granted to peacekeeping soldiers supposedly to ensure that the said soldiers 
are able to perform their functions without fear of interference by the host state. This same 
immunity is now enabling the soldiers to escape liability for gross violations of their mandate. 
1.3 Purpose of the study 
The main purpose of this dissertation is to analyse and discuss the effect of the immunity 
granted to MINUSCA and MONUSCO peacekeeping military personnel on their accountabil-
ity (or lack thereof) for the abuse of civilians contrary to their duty under their respective mis-
sion to protect the said civilians. 
1.4 Hypothesis 
The immunity granted to UN peacekeeping military personnel is very important for the overall 
effectiveness of the peacekeeping missions. However this immunity also means that the blue 
helmets are not subject to the jurisdiction of the host state and the head of their missions. As 
outlined in the model status of forces agr~ement for peacekeeping operations, military person-
nel are exclusively under the jurisdiction of their respective TCC in respect of any criminal 
activity in the host countries.20 Thus whether they are adequately held accountable for sexually 
abusing civilians is utterly under the discretion of their TCC. This means that their accounta-
bility for abusing civilians cannot be ascertained as it will be subject to the willingness and 
ability of the TCC to prosecute and investigate the abuses . As such the immunity granted to 
UN peacekeeping military personnel negatively affects their accountability for their abuse of 
civilians. 
1.5 Research questions 
In order to analyse how the immunity granted to MINUSCA and MONUSCO soldiers affects 
their accountability (or lack thereof) for their use of force against civilians contrary to their 
duty under their respective mission to protect the said civilians, the following are my research 
questions: 
19 Hunter L, ' Should we prosecute the protectors? Holding peacekeepers accountable in cases of sexual exploita-
tion and abuse ' I (I) Carleton Review of International Affairs, 2009, 19. 
20 UNGA, Model status- of forces agreement. 
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1. To what extent is the lack of accountability for the abuse of civilians by peacekeep-
ing soldiers a result of the immunity granted to them? 
2. To what extent is the immunity granted to the peacekeeping soldiers justified in 
light of its effect on their accountability for their abuse of civilians? 
1.6 Justification of the study 
MINUSCA and MONUSCO, are primarily mandated with the protection of civilians from the 
imminent threat of force. The immunity granted to peacekeeping military personnel is meant 
to facilitate the achievement of this goal. Ironically, many peacekeeping soldiers working under 
the two missions have been accused of sexually abusing civilians21 and almost none have been 
adequately held accountable fo~ the abuse.22 Many human rights activists have attributed this 
lack of accountability to the immunity granted to the peacekeeping military personnel,; without 
discussing how and why the immunity fosters lack of accountability and what this m~ans.23 
The claim that the immunity granted to peacekeeping soldiers fosters lack of accountability for 
their abuse of civilians needs is serious and thus needs to be discussed and analysed. This is 
because if true, it implies that the immunity granted to peacekeeping personnel is counterpro-
ductive. If indeed the immunity has enabled peacekeeping troops to escape accountability for 
their abuse of civilians, then it has allowed them to escape liability for gross violations of their 
mandate instead of facilitating the missions. Additionally and more importantly, the claim that 
the immunity fosters lack of accountability for the abuse of civilians is a serious one because 
of the importance of accountability for the overall effectiveness of the missions. 24 Thus if true, 
the claim implies that the immunity granted to peacekeeping soldiers undermines the effective-
ness of the missions. There is a legitimate interest in ensuring the effectiveness of these mis-
sions because of the resources invested in them in order to ensure the safety of vulnerable 
civilians.25 Therefore the claim that the immunity granted to peacekeeping soldiers fosters lack 
of accountability for their abuse of civilians must be discussed and analysed so as come up 
with ways to secure accountability and thus the effectiveness of the missions. 
21 Hall J, 'Children condemned by the UN to sexual abuse: regional analysis- Central Africa ' 23(2} Africa Conflict 
Monitor, 2016, 51-58. 
22 Moscoe A, ' Sexual exploitation and abuse in United Nations peace operations: towards evidence-based preven-
tion and response' Major Research Paper. University of Ottawa Graduate School of Public and International Af-
fairs. 
23 Hunter L, ' Should we prosecute the protectors?', 19-23. 
24 This will be discussed in the next chapter. 
25 For instance the approved Budget for MONUSCO for the year 2017-2018 is 1.2 billion dollars see 
https:/ /monusco. unmissions.org/en/facts-and-figures on 17 January 2018 
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1.7 Scope and limitations of the study 
The effect of the immunity granted to peacekeeping military personnel on the accountability 
for abuse of civilians will be analysed, only with regards to MONUSCO and MINUSCA and 
not peacekeeping missions in general. Because of time constraints, this study will not investi-
gate the veracity of allegations of abuse of civilians by peacekeeping soldiers will not be one, 
only the manner in which these allegations were treated will be analysed. 
1.8 Methodology and outline 
To analyse the possible effect of immunity granted to the blue helmets on their accountability 
for the abuse, the methodology will involve first explaining the importance of accountability 
for the effectiveness of the mission. Then an analysis of the cases of use abuse of ?ivilians by 
the peacekeeping soldiers and of the accountability (or lack thereof) for such acts will be done. 
In light of this the relationship between the immunity granted to the peacekeeping soldiers and 
the accountability will be analysed. The cases of abuse by blue helmets in the CAR and the 
DRC- including responses to the allegations- have been documented thoroughly by various 
human rights organisations (including UN agencies) as well as well-known independent 
searchers. These two categories of sources will provide a balanced perspective on the cases of 
abuse and will be my main source of information. 
1.9 Definition of terms 
Deterrence: Theory that asserts that punishment discourages people from committing 
crimes.26 
Host state: the country in which the peacekeeping occursY 
Immunity: the exclusion of certain persons, by law, from the criminal or civil jurisdiction of 
state that would otherwise have jurisdiction over the said state. 28 
Peacekeeping military personnel/soldiers: Troops contributed by a TCC for purposes of 
peacekeeping. 29 
Peacekeeping: The deployment of military forces by the United Nations in conflict areas in 
order to ensure the cessation of hostilities30 
26 Kevin K, 'A Critical Appraisal of Criminal Deterrence Theory' 8 Dickson Law Review (1983), 2. 
27 Code Blue Campaign, Privileges and immunities of the United Nations, 13 May 2015, 1. 
28 Code Blue Campaign, Privileges and immunities of the United Nations, 13 May 2015, 1. 
29 <http://peacekeeping.un.org/enlwhat-is-peacekeeping> on 23 November 2017. 
30 Bellamy A and Williams P, Understanding Peacekeeping, 34. 
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Troop contributing country or sending state: a United Nations member state that contributes 
its troops for purposes of peacekeeping. 31 
1.10 Chapter summary 
Chapter two: A discussion of the importance of accountability for the effectiveness of the mis-
SlOn. 
Chapter 3: An analysis of the cases of use abuse of civilians by the peacekeeping soldiers and 
of the accountability (and lack thereof) for such acts. 
Chapter 4: A discussion of the relationship between the immunity granted to the peacekeeping 
soldiers and the accountability for the abuse of civilians. 
Chapter 5: Conclusion and recommendations 
Chapter 6: Bibliography. 
31 <http: //peacekeeping.un.org/en/what-is-peacekeeping> on 23 November 2017. 
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2 Chapter Two: Conceptual framework 
The Human security concept and the theory of deterrence 
The restoration of international security is the primary reason for the deployment of UN peace-
keeping troops. 32 This security, when the first UN peacekeeping missions were deployed was 
state-centric and focused on the freedom of states from military aggression. 33 For instance the 
United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan in 1948 had the primary man-
date of supervising the ceasefire between India and Pakistan thus ensuring both state' s safety 
from external military aggression. 34 Even the missions that were started in response to internal 
conflicts focused on aiding national military forces to exterminate insurgents and excluded the 
direct protection of civilians from the effects of internal conflict. 35 This approach was unable 
to restore international security in several situations and often peacekeepers watched as civil-
ians were killed.36 Thus there was a need to re-conceptualise security with regard to UN peace-
keeping missions and a more human centric approach was adopted in the mid 90 ' s.37 This 
individual-centered approach to security (often called human security) has been incorporated 
in several peacekeeping missions where the missions are expressly mandated to focus on the 
safety of individuals . For instance the peacekeeping missions which serve as the case studies 
for this research, MINUSCA and MONUSCO, both have a primary mandate of directly pro-
tecting civilians from the imminent threat of force. 38 Thus both missions are primarily con-
cerned with human security and their effectiveness will depend on whether or not this security 
is ensured and a clear understanding of human security is needed. 
Human security is defined as the protection of the vital core of all human lives in ways that 
enhance human freedoms and human fulfilment. 39 This entails the protection of the fundamen-
tal freedoms of individuals from a variety of threats instead of focusing on the protection of 
32 Article 42, Charter of the United Nations (1945). 
33 Human security in theo1y and practice: an Overview of the Human Security Concept and the United Nations 
Trust Fund for Human Security, United Nations Human Security Unit Publication, 2009, 5. 
34 UNSC S/RES/47 (1948) Restoration of peace and order and the plebiscite in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. 
35 As in the case of the United Nations Operation in Mozambique see UNSC S/RES/782 The situation in Mozam-
bique (1992). 
36 As in the case of United Nations Mission is Srebrenica see Henderson 8, ' What have been the successes and 
failures of UN peacekeeping missions?' The telegraph, 28 September 2015 -< http://www.tele-
graph. co. uk/news/worl dnews/ europe/bosni a/11 7294 3 6/S rebrenica-2 0-years-on-What-have-been-the-successes-
and-failures-of-UN-peacekeeping-missions.html> on 5 September 2017. 
37United Nations Human Security Unit, Human security in theory and practice, 5. 
38 UNSC 1925 (2010) and UNSC 2149 (2014) . 
39 United Nations Human Security Unit, Human security in theory and practice, 5. 
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national defence forces from military aggression. Human security is people-centred40 which 
means that the individual is placed at the centre of analysis by protecting him from threats to 
his/her dignity. For several years now, one of the threats to the dignity of individuals in the 
CAR and the DRC is the sexual exploitation and other abuse by peacekeeping troops working 
for the respective mission's.41 Protecting these individuals from this threat has thus become 
part of the mandate of these missions. 
The best way to protect from threats to insecurity is early prevention- this is another core ele-
ment of the human security concept. 42 Human security seeks to minimise the impact of threats 
on individuals by avoiding the actualisation ofthe threat. This means that the two missions' 
mandate to protect civilians from the threat posed by peacekeeping troops is best achieved by 
preventing these peacekeeping troops from using violence against the civilians. Shielding the 
peacekeeping soldiers from accountability for their abuse of civilians does not prevent the harm 
and achieves the opposite. 
Many sociologists argue that punishment/accountability because of its deterrent effect is one 
of the best ways to prevent crime.43 This theory of deterrence- proposed by Thomas Hobbes, 
Cesare Beccaria amongst others- asserts that punishment discourages people from committing 
crimes.44 The rationale is that the human being is 'rational and .free and has the capability to 
choose among a variety of behavioural options '45 and so will choose the option which he/she 
believe has the least negative effect. There are two types of deterrent effects: specific and gen-
eral. Specific deterrence discourages the criminal from repeating his/her criminal behaviour 
because the severity of his punishment was such that it outweighs whatever benefits he/she was 
hoping to get from the crime.46 General deterrence discourages the public from committing 
crime because they have seen the severity of the punishment of the criminal and it outweighs 
the possible benefits of the crimeY For the punishment to have these deterrent effects, the 
probability of being caught for the crime must be high and the punishment must be severe 
enough to outweigh the potential benefits of the crime.48 
40 United Nations Human Security Unit, Human security in theory and practice, 6. 
41 Hall J, 'Children condemned by the UN to sexual abuse' , 51-58. 
42 United Nations Human Security Unit, Human security in theOIJ' and practice, 14. 
43 Donner M, 'Deterrence theory' in David L (ed.) Encyclopaedia of Crime and Punishment, SAGE Publications, 
2002,512-514. 
44 Kevin K, • A Critical Appraisal of Criminal Deterrence Theory' 8 Dickson Law Review (1983), 2. 
45 Donner M, 'Deterrence theory', 513. 
46 Donner M, ' Deterrence theory'. 512-514. 
47 Donner M, 'Deterrence theory', 512-514. 
48 Kevin K, ·A Critical Appraisal of Criminal Deterrence Theory ', 4. 
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Applying this theory of deterrence, in order to prevent the use of force against the civilians by 
the peacekeeping troops - and thus protect them according to the human security concept and 
the mandate of the respective missions - adequate accountability/punishment because of its 
deterrent effect is necessary. The accountability must be severe enough to discourage the per-
petrators from repeating their act (specific deterrence) and more importantly to discourage the 
other peacekeeping soldiers from abusing the civilians (general deterrence). Accountability for 
the use of force against civilians because of its deterrent effect is important in order to prevent 
the abuses and thus is a necessary condition in assessing whether these missions have fulfilled 
their mandate to protect the civilians against the threat posed by the peacekeeping soldiers 
according to the human security concept. 
The importance of accountability because of its deterrent effect in preventing the abuse of ci-
vilians by peacekeeping military personnel and thus for the achievement of the mandate of the 
missions in light of the human security concept, means that this accountability is necessary for 
the fulfilment of the mandates. Therefore the extent to which peacekeeping military personnel 
are held accountable for their abuse of civilians can assess the effectiveness of the missions. 
The claim that the immunity granted to the peacekeeping military personnel shields them from 
accountability needs to be analysed and discussed in order to fmd ways to ensure accountabil-
ity. 
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3 Chapter Three: The abuse of civilians by peacekeeping soldiers 
This chapter will analyse the cases of abuse of civilians by the peacekeeping soldiers and the 
accountability (or lack thereof) for such acts. A clear understanding of the two missions and 
the circumstances under which they were created is required thus a background ofMONUSCO 
and MINUSCA will be done before delving into the analysis of the allegations of abuse The 
response of the TCC as well as additional responses of the UN to the allegations will be ana-
lysed. 
3.1 Background of the missions 
3.1.1 MONUSCO 
The second Congo war began in August 1998 when the rebel group named Rally for Congolese 
Democracy (RCD) and other rebel factions with the backing of Rwanda and Uganda attempted 
to overthrow the Government of the then president of the DRC Laurent-Desire Kabila.49 In 
response to this attack, Kabila sought military support from friends and Angola, Zimbabwe, 
Sudan and Libya intervened. 5° With the help of these countries Kabila managed to push the 
rebels away from the capital but could not exterminate them and they continued to operate in 
the east of the country. 51 The UN called for a cease fire and in July 1999 the foreign parties 
agreed to withdraw from the DRC in a document called the Lusaka Agreement. 52 The UN 
mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) that predeceases MONUSCO was 
created in November 1999 to oversee the implementation of the Lusaka Agreement and facili-
tate the withdrawal of foreign military troops. 53 The RCD forces that continued to operate in 
the east of the county continued to pose threats to civilians54 and in response to this the mandate 
of MONUC was extended to include the protection of civilians using means that included mil-
itary personnel.'5 Until its replacement with MONUSCO in 2010 MONUC had a total of 
18,653 military troops from more than 60 TCC's including Bangladesh, South Africa, Sri 
Lanka, Kenya and Morocco. 56 The mission has been greatly criticised for its failure to protect 
49 Prunier G, Africa's World War: Congo, the Rwandan genocide, and the making of a continental catastrophe, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009, 303-350. 
50 Prunier, Africa 's World War, 303-350. 
51 Prunier, Africa's World War, 303-350. 
52 Prunier, .rlfrica 's World War. 347. 
53 UNSC S/RES/1279 (1999) The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 
54 Unknown, ' Afi-ica's great war' The Economist, 4 July 2002- <http://www.economist.com/node/1213296> on 
12 September 2017. 
55 UNSC S/RES/1565 (2004) The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 
56<http:/ /www. un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/monusco/facts.shtml> on 12 September 2017. 
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civilians, and has been referred to as 'the embodiment of all the failures and contradictions that 
have characterised the United Nations in the last decade '. 57 
Nevertheless, in acknowledgement of the progress the DRC had made in overcoming its secu-
rity challenges since the second Congo war the Security Council extended the mandate ofMO-
NUC, renaming it MONUSCO in 2010.58 The new mandate of the mission was to help stabilise 
the country in terms of peace and security. Because the rebel factions were still active in the 
eastern part of the country and continued to kill civilians MONUSCO was also mandated to 
protect civilians from imminent threat of physical violence and the deployment of blue helmets 
in the region was authorised. Despite the presence of MONUSCO troops, rebel factions con-
!inued to kill and rape in eastern DRC and in 2015 the UN Secretary General called for the 
strengthening of the military component of the missjon, to enable it to successfully protect 
civilians against the rebel groups.59 The UN Interve~tion Brigade (UNIB) was thus created, 
under MONUSCO by the Security Council. 60 This brigade was tasked with neutralising the 
M23 rebel group and other armed groups that continued to threaten the security of civilians in 
eastern DRC, with or without the aid of the Congolese national army. 61 This was the first time 
that a peacekeeping mission was specifically tasked with directly neutralising a rebel group.62 
This proactive approach to the protection of civilians reflects the shift of the security paradigm 
from a state-centric approach to the human security concept that puts individuals at the centre 
of security that happened in the mid 90's. 63 
3.1.2 MINUSCA 
The ongoing civil war in the Central African Republic began in 2012 when a rebel group called 
Seleka began a series of attacks against the then government. 64 The government negotiated 
with the group and this led to an unsuccessful agreement between the two parties. With the 
57 Dizolele M, 'The UN in Congo: The failure of a peacekeeping mission ' The New York Times, 10 May 2004-
<http://www. nyti mes. com/2004/05/1 0/ opini on/the-un-in-congo-the-fai I ure-of-a-peacekeeping-mis-
sion.html?mcubz=3> on 20 February 2017. 
58 UNSC 1925 (20 1 0), 1. 
59 Special Report of the Secretmy-General on the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Great Lakes region, 
The Secretary General, 2013, S/2013/ 119. 
60 UNSC S/RES/2098 (2013) The extension of the mandate ofMONUSCO. 
61 UNSC 2098 (2013), 6 
62 Benson J. ' The UN Intervention Brigade: Extinguishing Conflict or Adding Fuel to the Flames?' One Ea11h 
Future, DiscussionPaper ,20 16, I <http:/ I oefresearch. org/si tes/ defau lt/fi I es/ documents/pu bl icati ons/unintervention-
brigade.pdf> on 17 September 2017. 
63 See chapter 2 
64 Pejic G, 'Central African Republic ' South Front, 25 August 2016 - <https ://southfront.org/central-african-re-
public-an-ongoing-civil-war/> on 16 September 2017 . 
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alleged support of Sudan and Chad, the group managed to take control of the capital city Bangui 
in March 2013 and the President Fran<yois Bozize fled. 65 The group's leader Michel Djotodia 
declared himself president and after pressure from the Economic Community of Central Afri-
can States (ECCAS) an electoral commission was created.66 Elections were conducted and 
Djotodia was elected president but failed to control Seleka Militia who had spread throughout 
the country, killing raping and looting. 67 In response to these atrocities village protection 
groups together with members of the overthrown army forlned the Anti-Balaka movement68 
that started attacks against Selel~a Militia.69 In a failed attempt to stop the violence, President 
Djotodia disbanded the Seleka group but this did little to stop the violence as the group had 
divided into separate rebel factions that continued to fight against each other. 70 In response to 
this violence in December 2013, the African Urn on and France with the authorisation of the 
UN Security Council set up the International Mission under African Leadership to Support the 
Central African Republic (MISCA) and the Operation Sangaris respectively, two peacekeeping 
missions mandated with the protection of civilians in the CAR. 7 1 In January 2014 President 
Djotodia resigned and was replaced by Catherine Samba-Panza an interim head of state. The 
Ex Seleka and Anti Balaka militias continued to fight killing thousands of civilians and the 
Security Council feared the possibility of Genocide. 72 In an effort to strengthen the existing 
peacekeeping operations and curb the violence, MINUSCA was created in April 2014 by the 
UN Security Council as a replacement ofMISCA.73 The primary mandate of the mission was/is 
to protect civilians from threat of physical violence and to provide specific protection to women 
and children. 74 The mission was also tasked with facilitating the transitional process by provid-
ing technical assistance to the electoral process, as well as disbarment and reintegration of the 
65 Pejic G, 'Central African Republic' South Front, 25 August 2016 - <https://southfront.org/central-african-re-
public-an-ongoing-civil-war/> on 16 September 2017. 
66 Pcjic G, 'Central African Republic' South Front' , 25 August 2016 - <https ://southfront.org/central-african-
republic-an-ongoing-civil-war/> on 16 September 2017. 
67 Pejic G, ·central African Republic ' South Front 25 August 2016 - <https://southfront.org/central-african-re-
public-an-ongoing-civil-war/> on 16 September 2017. 
68 Mellgard E, 'What is the Antibalaka?' Religions and geopolitics, 29 January 2015 -<http://www.religionandge-
opolitics.org/anti-balaka/what-antibalaka> on 15 September 2017. 
69 Mellgard E, ' What is the Antibalaka?' Religions and geopolitics, 29 January 2015 -<http://www.religionandge-
opolitics.org/anti-balaka/what-antibalaka> on 15 September 2017. 
70 Encyclopredia Britannica, online- <https ://www.britannica.com/place/Centrai-African-Republic/The-21 st-cen-
tury#ref117471 0> on 15 September 2017. 
71 UNSC SIRES/ 2127 The situation in the Central African Republic (2013), 3-5. 
72 Mellgard E, ' What is the Antibalaka?' Religions and geopolitics, 29 January 2015 -<http://www.reli gionandge-
opolitics.org/anti-balaka/what-antibalaka> on 15 September 2017. 
73 UNSC 2149 (2014), 2. 
74 UNSC 2149 (2014), 9. 
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armed elements.75 Presidential Elections were held January 2016 and with the help of MI-
NUSCA, the new government was able to stabilise and reduce violence in the country. Never-
theless, this calm was short lived as in May 2017 clashes between Ex Seleka and Anti-Balaka 
militia resumed and 100 people were killed.76 The mandate ofMINUSCA ended in November 
2017 but was extended until November 2018.77 
3.2 Cases of abuse 
Instances of peacekeeping soldiers using violence against the civilians that they are mandated 
to protect are not uncommon: according to the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) 
from 2008 to 2013, 480 cases of sexual abuse of civilians by peacekeeping staff, military per-
sonnel were reported. 78 Moreover, a report by the Department of Peacekeeping operations 
shows that the cases of sexual exploitation committed by peacekeeping staff have increased 
since then.79 This information is illustrated below: 
Allegations of sexual abuse and exploitation of 












2010 2012 Year 2014 2016 
Figure 1: Allegations of sexual abuse and exploitation of civilians by UN peacekeepers 
(20 10 to 20 16). Source: Evaluation of the Enforcement and Remedial Assistance Efforts for Sexual 
Exploitation and Abuse by the United Nations and Related Personnel in Peacekeeping Operations, UN 
Office oflntemal Oversight, May 2015, 8-9. 
75 UNSC 2149 (2014), 10. 
76 <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/201 7/05/1 OO-killed-car-fighting-170517025938882.html> on 18 September 
2017. 
77 UNSC S/RES/2387 (2017) The extension of MINUSCA. 
78 Evaluation of the Enforcement and Remedial Assistance Efforts for Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by the United 
Nations and Related Personnel in Peacekeeping Operations, UN Office of Internal Oversight, May 2015, 8-9. 
79 UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Peacekeeping initiatives in action, March 2017, 1. 
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Out of all the UN peacekeeping operations, MONUSCO and MINUSCA have the highest num-
ber of cases of abuse of civilians by peacekeeping soldiers80 : 
Cases of abuse of civilians by UN peacekeeping 






Figure 2: Cases of abuse of civilians by UN peacekeeping soldiers per 
mission (2016) . Source: UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 
Peacekeeping initiatives in action, March 2017, 1. 
Neither the UN nor the host's countries can punish the offending soldiers since all peacekeep-
ing military personnel are immune from the jurisdiction of the host countries. According to the 
model status of forces agreement for peacekeeping operations, military personnel are exclu-
sively under the jurisdiction of their respective TCC in respect of any criminal activity in the 
host countries .81 Thus in all the allegations, the ICC's have a duty to investigate and punish 
offenders. When the Conduct and Discipline Teams in the field receive a sexual exploitation 
allegation (or other criminal allegation) that involves military personnel, it is referred to the 
concerned TCC for investigation.82 The table below illustrates the actions taken by ICC's in 
response to allegations of sexual assault made against MINUSCA and MONUSCO military 
personnel in 2015: 83 
80 UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Peacekeeping initiatives in action, March 2017, 1. 
81 UNGA, Comprehensive Review of the whole question o.f peacekeeping operations in all their aspects: Model 
status- o.f- forces agreement, UN A/45/594 (9 October 1990). 
82 UNGA, Model status- of- forces agreement. 
83 UNGA, Special measuresforprotectionfrom sexual exploitation and sexual abuse, UN N70/729 (16 February 
2016). 
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Mission Allegations investigated Pending action by TCC 
byTCC (%) after investigation (%) 
MINUSCA 58 100 
MONUSCO 82 100 
Figure 3: Table showing the outcomes of investigations. Source: UNGA, Special 
measures for protection from sexual exploitation and sexual abuse, UN A/70/729 (16 
February 2016). 
As this table shows, though most allegations were investigated by the respective TCC, in both 
missions the TCC has not reported on the outcome of the investigations and any actions taken 
against the suspected soldier. 
Below are details of some allegations against military personnel working for the two missions 
and the responses to them: 
1. Some allegations against MONUSCO soldiers 
In 2008, 100 peacekeeping soldiers from India - one of the largest contributors of military 
personnel to UN peacekeeping operations84 - working under MONUSCO (then MONUC) were 
accused by human rights observers of forming a prostitution ring and paying children in North 
Kivu for sex. 85 In response to this, India investigated the matter and all hundred men were held 
to be innocent. 86 The government of India proceeded to condemn the UN for unnecessarily 
embarrassing the country. 87The official report of the Indian authorities is confidential and so it 
is impossible to assess the accuracy of the findings. Nevertheless, as Bhanvi Satija writes, even 
for sexual assault committed on Indian soil, Indian military personnel are rarely held account-
able as a result of The Armed Forces Special Powers Act which grants them immunity from 
criminal liability for acts committed in the line of duty and under which they can be prosecuted 
only if the government deems it fit. 88 Though Satija laments that the government took the cases 
84 Wyss M and Tardy T, Peacekeeping in Aji-ica: The evolving security architecture, Routledge, London, 2014, 
6. 
85 Caplan G, 'Peacekeepers gone wild: How much more abuse will the UN ignore in Congo?' The Globe and 
Mail, 3 August 20 12-< https:/ /beta. theglobeandmail. com/news/politics/second-reading/peacekeepers-gone-wild-
how-much-more-abuse-will-the-un-ignore-in-congo/article446215 l/?ref-=http://www. theglobeandma i !.com&> 
on 29 September 2017. 
86Akonor, UN Peacekeeping in Africa, 39 
87 Akonor, UN Peacekeeping in Aji-ica, 39. 
88 Satija B, 'UN reports sexual abuse by Indian peacekeepers, and we Ignore similar situation back home' Youth 
Ki Awaaz, 2015, 2-<https:/lwww. vouthkiawaaz.com/2015/06/sexuaf-viofence-by-the-indian-armv/> on 28 Sep-
tember 2017. 
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of against peacekeepers more seriously than those against their soldiers at home89, it is not 
unreasonable to imagine that these cases were most treated with the same disregard sexual 
assault cases are held with in India. Vulnerable people, including children were sexually ex-
ploited yet no one was held liable. 
In 2016, Tanzanian peacekeeping soldiers working under MONUSCO- specifically the UNIB-
were accused of sexually abusing minors in eastern DRC.90 MONUSCO promptly reacted, 
sending a response team to the area so as to ascertain the facts. The accused men were ordered 
to remain in their camp (and later deported) and Tanzanian authorities were informed and sked 
to investigate the matter. 91 Tanzania' s ambassador to the UN Tuvako Monongi was outraged 
by the allegations and expressed Tanzania' s commitment to effectively investigate the matter.92 
He explained that a commission had been set up to inquire into the matters and that the inves-
tigation would possibly lead to prosecution and/or dismissal from the military service. 93 Nev-
ertheless, a year and a half later and a report of the investigation is yet to be released and no 
arrests have been made. 94 
2. Allegations against MINUSCA 
The cases of sexual exploitation by peacekeepers were first brought to the public's attention in 
2015 when Anders Kompass Chief of Field Operations at the UN leaked a confidential report 
to French authorities. 95This report details sexual exploitation of more than 100 women and 
children in the CAR by French soldiers working under the Operation Sangaris96 committed 
between 2013 to 2014 and Kompass- who has resigned after being investigated by the lOS 
for breach of professional confidentiality - claimed that UN officials had failed to take the 
89 Satija B, ' UN rep01ts sexual abuse by Indian peacekeepers' , 2. 
90 Akonor, UN Peacekeeping in Africa, 42. 
91 Akonor, UN Peacekeeping in Africa, 42. 
92 Bryce-Pease S, 'Ambassador laments allegations of rape against troops in Tanzania' SABC, 6 April 2016 -
<http: //www .sabc.co.za/news/a/038d81 004c4cbb29a42caf66ac5e 1 Obb/ Ambassador-laments-allegations-of-
rape-against-troops-in-Tanzania-20 160604 Ambassador -laments-a !legations-of-rape-against -troops-in-Tanzania-
20160604> on 30 September 2017. 
93 Bryce-Pease S, 'Ambassador laments allegations of rape against troops in Tanzania' SABC, 6 April 2016 -
<http: //www .sabc.co.za/news/a/038d81 004c4cbb29a4 2caf66ac5e I Obb/ Ambassador-laments-allegations-of-
rape-against -troops-in-Tanzania-20 160604 Ambassador-laments-a II egations-of-rape-a gai nst -troops-in-Tanzania-
20160604> on 30 September 2017. 
94Kelley K, 'TZ troops now accused of sex abuse in DRC' The Citizen, 4 April 2016 -<http://www.thecit-
izen.co.tz/News/TZ-troops-now-accused-of-sex-abuse-in-DRC/1840340-3145178-j32jcu/index.html> on 1 Oc-
tober 2017. 
95 Essa A, ' Why do some peacekeepers rape? The full repmt' AI Jazeera, 10 August 2017 -
<http://www .alj azeera.corn/indepth/features/20 17 /08/peacekeepers-rape-full-report-170804134221292 .html> on 
2 October 2017. 
96 See page 12. 
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matter seriously.97 The report which contains some disturbing allegations- including sodomy 
of 9 year old boys and teenagers who were force to engage in sexual activity with dogs 98-
caused public outrage and prompted a series of Investigations by the UN and human rights 
organisations.99 These series of reports revealed several cases of sexual abuse by MINUSCA 
soldiers and in August 2015, the chief ofMINUCA resigned. 100 Since then, more and more 
cases of sexual exploitation by MINUSCA soldiers keep emerging. Below is a summary of 
some of them. 
Troops from the Republic of Congo working for MINUSCA have been notorious for allega-
tions of sexual exploitation against civilians. For instance, a woman was allegedly gang raped 
by an unknown number of men from the battalion 100 meters from the peacekeeping base in 
.Boda. 101 A week after the allegation was made, a representative from The Republic of Congo 
·commenced investigations. This investigation concluded that the allegations were unsubstan-
tiated because despite the fact that medical examination showed that the woman had been phys-
ically and sexually aggressed, the peacekeepers were not allowed to go out at night. This is just 
one of the several allegations against Congolese soldiers working under MINUSCA and in 
2015, 120 of them were repatriated after allegations of sexual exploitation of children. 102In 
June 2017, President Sassou Nguesou decided to withdraw all his troops working under MI-
NUSCA, and a UN statement on the matter claimed that the cases of sexual exploitation pointed 
to systematic problems in the battalion. No arrest has been made by Congolese authorities 
against any of the men. 
Two Burundian Soldiers working under MINUSCA allegedly assaulted and attempted to rape 
two women after they refused to engage in sexual activity with the men in public. 103 This led 
97 Laville S, ' Child sex abuse whistle-blower resigns from UN ' The Guardian, 7 June 2016 -
<https:/ /www. theguardian.corn/world/20 16/ jun/07 /chi ld-sex-abuse-whistleblower-resi gns-from-un> on 1 Octo-
ber 2017. 
98 Dearden L, 'French troops accused of 'forcin-g girls into bestiality' in CAR as rape claims mount against UN 
peacekeepers ' The Independent, 30 March 2016 -<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/french-
troops-accused-of-forc ing-girls-to-ha ve-sex-with-dog-in-car-as-rape-claims-a gainst-un-a6961711. html> on 2 
September 2017. 
99More allegations of sexual abuse of children by foreign soldiers in the Central African Republic, The office of 
the United Nations high commissioner for human rights, 1 February 2016. 
100 Halliday .1 , ' UN peacekeeping chief in CAR sacked over sex abuse claims' The Guardian, 7 August 2015 -
<https :I lwww. theguardian. com/world/20 15/ aug/ 12/un -peacekeeping -chief-centra 1-a frican -republic-resigns-
babacar-gaye> on 2 September 2017. 
101 Code Blue Campaign, Confidential: Sexual Exploitation and Abuse Case Files MINUSCA , 13 September 2017, 
5. 
102 AlJazeera, ·congo peacekeepers accused of sex abuse to leave CAR', 22 June 2017. 
103 Code Blue Campaign, Confidential: Sexual Exploitation and Abuse Case Files MINUSCA, 13 September 2017, 
7-8. 
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to a commotion and local authorities managed to arrest one of the men. He was later released 
to the UN because he is immune from the jurisdiction of Central-African authorities. The sol-
dier's commander admitted that he failed to investigate the matter after the man was released 
to him and he was disciplined for this failure. It is not clear what further actions were taken. 
3.2.1 Measures taken by the UN in response to the allegations 
In 2015 after Anders Kompass leaked the report 104 detailing the blatant disregard with which 
UN officials treated the cases of sexual exploitation against peacekeeping staff in the CAR, the 
already existing public outrage regarding the lack of accountability for abuses to civilians by 
peacekeeping staff. For instance, the United States has been threatening to cut funding to UN 
peacekeeping operations 105 , claiming that the allegations of abuse put in question the suitability 
of such operations for the maintenance of inteinational security. 106 In response to these pres-
sures, the UN took a series a measures to prevent sexual exploitation of civilians by peacekeep-
ing staff and to foster accountability as detailed in the UN report. Most of these measures con-
cern allegation against non-military peacekeeping personnel who are generally not immune 
from the criminal jurisdiction of host states. Nevertheless, there have been attempts to address 
cases against military personnel by encouraging TCC's to take the allegations seriously. Below 
are some of these measures: 
3 .2.1.1 The Kigali principles on the protection of civilians 
These principles were formulated in Rwanda in early 2015, at a high level conference on the 
protection of civilians that brought together various stakeholders to peacekeeping operations 
including TCC's and financial contributors. The main objective ofthe conference and there-
sulting principles is to provide a guidelines that will facilitate the implementation of the peace-
keeper's mandate to protect civilians. The present TCC's undertook to hold their respective 
troops to the highest standard of conduct, to adequately investigate allegations of abuse of ci-
vilians and hold culprits accountable. 107 Though they are endorsed by more than 30 top TCC's, 
these principles are not mandatory or legally binding 108 and thus will not compel the TCC's to 
adequately hold their soldiers accountable for the abuse of civilians 
104 See page 16. 
105 AI Jazeera, "Congo peacekeepers accused of sex abuse to leave CAR', 22 June 2017. 
106 Sengupta S, ' UN peacekeeping faces overhaul as US threatens to cut funding' The New York Times, 24 March 
2017 < https:/ /www .nytimes.corn/20 17 /03/24/world/united-nations-peacekeeping-trump-administration.html> 
on 30 July 2017. 
107 Principle 13-15, The Kigali principles on the protection of civilians, 29 May 2015. 
108 Global centre for the responsibility to protect, Peacekeeping and the Kigafi Principfes, 1 June 2017. 
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3.2.1.2 UN Security council resolution 2272 (2016) on sexual abuse by peacekeepers 
This resolution was adopted in March 2016. It expresses deep concern for the sexual abuse of 
civilians by peacekeeping forces and provides for measures to ensure accountability. 109 For 
instance, countries that have previously failed to adequately investigate allegations of sexual 
exploitation against their troops and/or to hold culprits accountable will subjected to the fol-
lowing110: 
1. Their troops will be repatriated or replaced 
n. Their participation in peacekeeping may be suspended 
111. They will be barred from future/present participation in peacekeeping. 
This resolution is inadequate for purposes of ensuring accountability. The repatriation and sus-
pension of troops of a TCC that fails to adequately hold offending soldiers accountable for the 
abuse of civilians will not compel the TCC's to prosecute their soldiers. Instead, it will reduce 
the number of soldiers involved in peacekeeping as states- the only source of military personnel 
for UN peacekeeping111 - will be discouraged to contribute their soldiers. This repatriation/sus-
pension would be damaging to state's reputation and since peacekeeping does not benefit the 
TCC significantly, most states will likely choose not to contribute their troops. Though the ban 
on TCC's that fail to adequately hold their soldiers accountable will ensure only states that are 
willing and able to adequately investigate the mater 
3.3 Summary of findings 
The abuses of civilians by MONUSCO AND MINSCA peacekeeping military personnel are 
extensive and yet the culprits have mostly escaped liability. The TCC'S have failed to ade-
quately investigate allegations of abuse and prosecute their troops. The additional measures 
taken by the UN to foster accountability are mostly inadequate. The next chapter will analyse 
the relationship between this lack of accountability and the immunity granted to peacekeeping 
military personnel. 
109 UNSC S/RES/2272 (2016) Sexual abuse by UN peacekeepers. 
110 UNSC 2272 (2016), 2-3. 
111 Hunter L, 'Should we prosecute the protectors?' , 22-23. 
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4 Chapter four: The relation between the immunity of peacekeeping mili-
tary personnel and the lack accountability 
As established in the previous chapter, the sending states are entirely responsible for the inves-
tigation/prosecution of their soldiers for any criminal misconduct and they have mostly failed 
to adequately hold their soldiers accountable for the abuse of civilians. In light of this, this 
chapter will attempt to justify the immunity granted to peacekeeping soldiers and analyse the 
reasons for the failure to hold them accountable as well as evaluate any possible solutions. 
4.1 Justifying Immunity 
As a general principle of customary international law, states are sovereign. 112 They have com-
plete autonomy over their own affairs. The arms of government and affairs of a state should be 
free from any interference by another state. 113 The military because it is indispensable for the 
defence of a state' s sovereignty and interests needs special protection from foreign interfer-
ence.114 During peacekeeping operations, soldiers from a TCC operate on the territory of an-
other sovereign state. In such a situation, the host state has complete jurisdiction over the ter-
ritory on which the peacekeeping occurs according to customary international law.115This 
means that TCC soldiers would be subject to the jurisdiction of the host state. However, this 
would also mean that the military of the TCC is potentially subject to any interference by the 
host state through judicial or military action. This is problematic as it leaves the· sovereignty of 
the TCC vulnerable to violation by the host state. 
TCC's would most likely not participate in peacekeeping if they did not have exclusive juris-
diction over their soldiers, as doing so would potentially compromise the independence of their 
military and thus their sovereignty. 116 For instance, the United States withdrew its troops from 
a peacekeeping mission in Eritrea and Ethiopia shortly after the establishment of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court (ICC) because of the slim possibility that its soldiers could be prosecuted 
by the ICC. 11 7 Even though the USA was not party to the Rome Statute, there were fears that 
112 Article 2, Charter of the United Nations (24 October 1945). 
11 3 Case concerning military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of 
America), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1986, 300. 
11 4 Deng F and Kimaro S, Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa, Brookings Institution 
Press, Washington, 1996, 23-35 . 
11 5 The Case of the S.S. Lows (France v Turkey), Judgement, PCIJ Reports 1927, 22. 
116 Hunter L, 'Should we prosecute the protectors? Holding peacekeepers accountable in cases of sexual exploi-
tation and abuse ' I (I) Carleton Review of International Affitirs, 2009, 19 . 
117 Lumpkin J, ' US to pull forces from 2 UN missions ' Associated Press, 1 July 2004- <https: //www.global-
policy.org/component/content/article/199/41 073.html> on 8 December 2017. 
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Eritrea and Ethiopia would accede to the treaty and thus American soldiers could be prosecuted 
if they committed crimes enshrined in the Rome stature in Eritrea and Ethiopia. 118 Peacekeep-
ing depends entirely on military contributions by states 119 and would not exist if states refused 
to participate. Therefore, to ensure state participation in peacekeeping, peacekeeping soldiers 
are granted immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the host states and their sending states 
retain exclusive jurisdiction over them. 120 If this immunity was waived, states would withdraw 
their troops and peacekeeping would become impossible. This explains why despite pul?lic 
pressure to foster accountability, the UN has not contemplated waiving this the immunity of 
peacekeeping forces, and instead has inadequate taken measures to encourage the TCC's to 
adequately hold their soldiers accountability. 121 
On the- other hand, the immunity granted to peacekeeping ~oldiers, because it leaves the ac-
countability of the soldiers for criminal misconduct at the sole discretion of their TCC, is prob-
lematic. 122 As established in the second chapter, accountability for the use of force against ci-
vilians because of its deterrent effect is important in order to prevent the abuses and thus a 
necessary condition in assessing whether these missions have fulfilled their mandate to protect 
civilians against the threat posed by the blue helmets according to the human security con-
cept.123 Thus, the fact that the immunity granted to peacekeeping soldiers fosters lack of ac-
countability for their abuse of civilians cannot be disregarded and must be addressed. However, 
this immunity is indispensable and without it, peacekeeping would not be feasible because 
states would not contribute their soldiers, as discussed above. On one hand the immunity makes 
the peacekeeping missions feasible and on other hand it renders the missions ineffective by 
fostering lack of accountability. This is indeed a dilemma because waiving the immunity so as 
to enhance the effectiveness of the missions would render the missions impossible. The im-
munity is a necessary evil because without MONUSCO and MINUSCA, the civilians in the 
DRC and the CAR would be vulnerable to insecurity posed by civil war 124and thus be in a 
worse position than they are now, even despite the abuse by peacekeeping soldiers. For in-
118 Lumpkin J, 'US to pull forces from 2 UN missions' Associated Press, 1 July 2004 - https://www.global-
policy.org/component/content/article/199/41 073.html. 
119 Hunter L, 'Should we prosecute the protectors?',22-23. 
120 UNGA, Comprehensive Review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects: Model 
status- of- forces agreement, UN N45/594 (9 October 1990) . 
121 See page 18-19. 
122 See chapter 3 
123 See chapter 2 
124 See page 10-12. 
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stance, the UN Intervention Brigade created under MONUSCO in collaboration with the Con-
golese army drove the M23 rebel group that had been killing and raping thousands of civilians 
out of the DRC. 125 Likewise, with the help of MINUSCA, the new government of the CAR 
was able to stabilise and reduce the extensive violence in the country. 126 The two missions are 
necessary in order to ensure the safety of vulnerable civilians in the face of weak governments 
127 and they cannot be done away with. This means that any measures taken to foster accounta-
bility of soldiers for abuse of civilians cannot include the waiver of the immunity. Instead, any 
such measure must examine and address the factors/reasons that make immunity problematic 
in holding peacekeeping soldiers accountable for abuse of civilians. 
4.2 Immunity and lack of accountability 
Having established that the immunity granted to peacekeeping soldiers is indispensable to the 
UN peacekeeping model and therefore cannot be waived even though it is problematic in en-
suring that soldiers who abuse civilians are held accountable, it is essential to understand why 
this immunity fosters lack of accountability. · 
The immunity granted to the soldiers negatively affects the collection of evidence regarding 
the allegations. As Jessica Hatcher explains, when a peacekeeping soldier is accused of sex-
ually of abusing civilians, the head of the mission repatriates him/her to his/her home country 
and invites the TCC to investigate the matter. 128 This means that the accused might not be 
available at the crime scene and that essential evidence cannot be gathered: the collection of 
DNA samples, identification by witnesses, questioning etc . cannot be done without the sus-
pect.129 All these processes are important to ensure a credible investigation. In exercising its 
criminal jurisdiction over the suspect, the TCC might thus be unable to conduct a thorough 
125 Barrera A, 'The Congo trap: MONUSCO Islands of stability in the sea of instability' 4(1) International Journal 
ofSecuri~y & Development, 2015, 1-16. 
126 Benn M, 'Newly Elected Central African Republic Leader Faces Hard Realities ' The New York Times, 21 
February 2016 - <https :/ /www .nyti mes. com/20 16/02/22/world/africa/newly-elected-central-african-republic-
leader-faces-hard-realities.html?mcubz=3> on 16 September 2017. 
127 Baaz M and Verweijen J, 'The volatility of a half-cooked bouillabaisse: Rebel-military integration and conflict 
dynamics in the eastern DRC' 112(449) African Affairs, 2013. 
128Hatcher J, ' Defining Peacekeeping Downward: The U.N. Debacle in Eastern Congo' World Time, 26 Novem-
ber 2012- <http: //world. time.corn/20 12/11126/defining-peacekeeping-downward-the-u-n-debacle-ineastern-
congo/> on 25 December 2016. 
129 Metejik L, DNA sampling privacy and police investigation in a suspect society ' 61(3) Arkansas Law Review, 
2008, 53. 
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investigation that would ensure accountability. Furthermore, in order to conduct a proper in-
vestigation, the TCC needs to use certain tools of evidence collection such as search warrants 
whose use would potentially violate the sovereignty of the host state. As principle of interna-
tional customary law, a state cannot exercise its jurisdiction over the territory of another unless 
it has express permission to do so. 130 Thus, the use of such tools by a TCC would need the 
formal authorisation of the host state. 131 The process of getting such formal authorisation is 
time-consuming and this might further compromise the investigation, especially considering 
the time-sensitive nature of sexual abuse132 and the fact that the host states in question are war 
zones and civilians who are potential witnesses are likely to vanish at any time. All these mean 
that the immunity compromises the investigations of the allegations of abuses. 
The peacekeeping soldiers are under the exclusive criminal jurisdiction of their TCC thus 
whether they are held accountable for sexual abuse of civilians depends on the adequacy of the 
TCC's legal system. This is explained by Lauren Hunter who writes that the legal systems of 
various UN member states do not correspond to international standards and may not have leg-
islation requiring the prosecution of peacekeeping soldiers for abuse of civilians in host 
states. 133 For instance, the Italian Military Criminal Code does not criminalise the rape and 
torture of civilians by Italian soldiers and thus when Italian peacekeepers raped Somali women, 
they were simply disciplined but could not be prosecuted. 134 Likewise, because of the inade-
quacy of the Indian legal system, a hundred Indian peacekeeping soldiers working under 
MONUSCO who were accused of sexual exploitation in the DRC were not held accountable 
for their actions. 135 As Bhanvi Satija writes, this lack of accountability is not surprising since 
even for sexual assault committed on Indian soil, Indian military personnel are rarely held ac-
countable as a result of The Armed Forces Special Powers Act which grants them immunity 
from criminal liability for acts committed in the line of duty and under which they can be 
130 The Case of the S.S. Lotus, PCIJ, 22. 
131 Kerr 0 , 'Search warrants in an era of digital evidence' 75(2) Mississippi Law Journal, 2005, 86-91. 
132 Ferris Land Sandercock J. 'The sensitivity of forensic tests for rape ' 17(3) Medicine and Law, 1998, 335-348. 
133 Hunter L, 'Should we prosecute the protectors?' ,20-21. 
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in Mazurana D and Parpat J (eds) Gender conflict and peacekeeping, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 17 Feb-
ruary 2005, 90 . 
135 See page 15. 
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prosecuted only if the government deems it fit. 136 The inadequate legal systems often allow the 
culprits to escape liability for the abuse of civilians. 
The TCC' s ability to conduct an impartial investigation or prosecution can be comprised by its 
various interests in not declaring its soldiers guilty of sexually abusing civilians. For instance, 
a TCC will want to preserve a good reputation and absolve itself of any blame for the miscon-
duct of its soldiers. 137 This desire to preserve a good reputation was demonstrated by India' s 
quick rebuke of the UN for embarrassing the country with such accusations. 138 Even when 
TCC's troops are repatriated for abuse of civilians, the TCCs' avoid revealing the real reason 
for the repatriation. For example in 2015 when the Congolese troops were repatriated for wide-
spread sexual violence aga_inst civilians in the CAR, the matter was presented as simply a de-
cision of President Sassou Nguesso to withdraw the troops. 139 This desire to protect the repu-
tation of their states can mean that the suspects will never be found guilty. Even TCCs' that 
claim to be committed to ensure the accountability of their soldiers do not report back on the 
outcome of their investigations and whether there was a prosecution. For example in 2012 
when Tanzanian peacekeeping soldiers working under MONUSCO were accused of rape in 
the DRC, Tanzania claimed to take the matter seriously and a commission of enquiry was set 
up. Nevertheless, a year and a half later and a report of the investigation is yet to be released 
and no arrests have been made. 140 This unlikelihood of states to fmd and declare their soldiers 
guilty in order to preserve their reputation explains the lack of accountability observed for cases 
of abuse against civilians. 
In view of the foregoing, the immunity granted to peacekeeping soldiers negatively affects their 
accountability for the abuse of civilians to the extent that (i) it subjects the investigation to the 
legal systems of the TCC, which are often inadequate, (ii) it compromises the collection of 
evidence, and (iii) it compromises the impartiality of the process. Because the immunity cannot 
be waived, these factors needs to be addressed in order to foster accountability for the abuse of 
civilians be peacekeeping soldiers. 
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4.3 Possible ways to foster accountability 
A number of solutions have been proposed to ensure peacekeeping soldiers are held adequately 
accountable for their abuse of civilians. The feasible solutions i.e. those that do not require the 
waiver of the immunity need to be evaluated based on the factors discussed above that make 
the immunity problematic: effect on the collection of evidence, inadequacy of legal systems 
and lack of impartiality. 
4.3.1 The establishment of an international military tribunal 
Some have proposed the establishment of an international tribunal that would have the juris-
diction to prosecute peacekeeping soldiers who have abused civilians. 141 Under this model, the 
peacekeeping soldiers would still be immune from the jurisdiction of the host_ state but the TCC 
would not have exclusive jurisdiction over them. The stakeholder states would agree on a legal 
instrument that would adequately provide for the prosecution of peacekeeping soldiers who 
abuse civilians. Thus the accountability would not be left under the discretion of the TCC who 
may have inadequate laws. 
The proponents of this solution have argued that an intentional tribunal would not be subject 
to the same biases as the courts of a TCC and thus would ensure an impartial process. 142 The 
tribunal would be independent and free from interference by TCC's who have any interests in 
the innocence of their soldiers. However this assertion assumes that the judges/prosecutors of 
the tribunal would be completely outside the sphere of influence of states. This is not true since 
the tribunal would be created through an agreement of all concerned states and thus each state 
would influence the manner in which it operates and possibly participate in the appointment of 
judges. Moreover the tribunal would need funding from states in order to function and the 
funding states will most probably influence the manner in which it operates. Therefore, an 
international tribunal will not necessarily be impartial 143 in holding peacekeeping soldiers ac-
countable for the abuse of civilians. 
An international tribunal would face the same challenges as a TCC in conducting a credible 
investigation into allegations of abuse of civilians by peacekeeping soldiers. It would not be 
141 Leek C, 'International Responsibility in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Command and Control Ar-
rangements and the Attribution ofConduct' 10(1) Melbourne Journal of International Law, 2009,346-364. 
142 Leek C, 'International Responsibility in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations', 356. 
143 Mackenzie Rand Sands P, 'International courts and tribunals and the independence of the international judge' 
44(1) Harvard International Law Journal, 2003, 271-286. 
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possible for the tribunal to have representatives in all the host states because of economic con-
straints. Thus, the investigators from the tribunal would not be able to start the investigation as 
soon as the allegations are brought forward and this would compromise the process, consider-
ing the time sensitive nature of sexual abuse. Furthermore, just like the TCC an international 
tribunal would need formal authorisation in order to use certain tools of collection of evidence, 
such as search warrants in the territory of a host state. The process of acquiring such formal 
authorisation is time consuming and will further compromise the collection of evidence. More-
over, considering the challenges that the ICC is currently facing in securing the cooperation of 
states with it investigations144, it is not guaranteed that the host states and the other stakeholder 
states will always facilitate the investigations conducted by this proposed international tribunal. 
States have different political interests and motives that would affect the extent to which they 
cooperate with an international tribunaVcourt. 145 The tribunal would be unable to collect im-
portant eveidence situated in the territory of a state that refuses to cooperate. This would affect 
the ability of the tribunal to conduct credible investigations and thus to ensure that peacekeep-
ing soldiers who abuse civilians are adequately held accountable. 
Additionally and perhaps more importantly, an international tribunal will threaten the sover-
eignty of TCCs' in the same manner that waiving the immunity of the peacekeeping soldiers 
would. Though the peacekeeping military personnel would still be immune from the jurisdic-
tion of the host state, they would be under the jurisdiction of this international tribunal. The 
troops would no longer be under the exclusive jurisdiction of their TCC. As explained earlier, 
the military 's role in protecting the sovereignty and interest of a state is indispensable and this 
why states want to retain exclusive jurisdiction over their military personnel. The United States 
threats to veto a Security council resolution to extend the mandates of the UN peacekeeping 
missions and Bosnia and Herzegovina until its troops were exempted from the jurisdiction of 
the ICC 146clearly exemplifies the reluctance of states to give up the exclusive jurisdiction over 
their soldiers. States will not risk any interference with their military by subjecting them to 
external judicial proceedings especially since contribution of peacekeeping troops does not 
144 Demirdjian A, 'Armless giants: cooperation. state responsibility and suggestions for the ICC review confer-
ence' 10(2) International Criminal Law Review, 2010. 
145 Hillebrecht C and Straus S, ' Who pursues the perpetrators? State cooperation with the ICC' 39(1) Human 
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significantly benefit the TCCs. 147 The establishment of such a tribunal would most probably 
result in the withdrawal of troops by many TCCs. This would be disastrous since peacekeeping 
relies solely on military contributions by states 148 and would weaken the existing missions and 
eventually cause the abolition of peacekeeping. This would leave civilians who depend on 
peacekeeping missions such as MONUSCO and MINUSCA vulnerable to insecurity. 
All in all, the establishment of an international tribunal to prosecute peacekeeping soldiers for 
their abuse of civilians would not foster accountability significantly better than the current 
model. This is because an international tribunal would face the same issues that the current 
model- under which the soldiers can only be prosecuted by their TCC- faces in ensuring the 
culprits are held accountable. 
4.3.2 The establishment of Court Martials in the host state 
The UN Secretary- General, in 2016, recommended the establishment of court-martials in the 
host state by each TCC to deal the allegations of sexual abuse of civilians against its military 
personnel. 149 The court Martials would be composed of members of the TCCs armed forces 
and would operate according to the laws of the TCCs'. As such, the immunity of the peace-
keeping soldiers would be preserved and they would be under the exclusive jurisdiction of their 
respective TCC. The court Martials would operate on the territory of the host state and this 
would need formal authorisation of the host state. Consequently, model status of forces agree-
ment would need to be amended to impose a duty on the host state to authorise and cooperate 
with the court Martials. 
The UN Secretary General argues that an onsite court martial would be better placed to conduct 
a credible investigation into allegations of sexual abuse of civilians by peacekeeping sol-
diers.150 This is because unlike in the current model, the court would be present at the crime 
scene and thus would have quicker and better access to victims and physical evidence. This 
would avoid any unnecessary delay that would compromise the investigation. Moreover, the 
undertaking by the host state to cooperate with the court means that tools of evidence collection 
such as search warrants would not be delayed by formalities. 
147 K Coleman and B Nyblade. 'Peacekeeping for profit: the scope and limits of mercenary UN peacekeeping ' 
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Nevertheless, because the court Martials would operate under the laws ofthe TCCs' , whether 
the soldiers are held accountable for sexual abuse of civilians would still depend on the ade-
quacy of the TCC's legal system. As explained above the inadequacy ofTCCs ' laws has ena-
bled soldiers who have sexually abused civilians to escape liability. 151 However with regards 
to a court martial this problem can be solved because they typically operate under specialised 
laws and do not apply the general laws of a country.152 Whereas it would be unrealistic/imprac-
tical to require all TCCs ' to change their entire legal systems, they can be reasonably required 
to change only their court martial rules. Therefore, requiring all TCCs' martial courts rules to 
adequately provide for the prosecution and punishment of peacekeeping soldiers who sexually 
abuse civilians would ensure that inadequate legal systems are no longer obstacles to account-
ability. 
Although not perfect, this solution solves some of the issues that the current model is facing in 
ensuring that peacekeeping soldiers are held accountable for their abuse of civilians. 
15 1 See page 23. 
152 Fairman C, Th e law of martial rule, Callaghan, Chicago, 1930, 5. 
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5 Chapter Five: Conclusion and recommendations 
The main purpose of this dissertation is to analyse and discuss the effect of the immunity 
granted to MINUSCA and MONUSCO peacekeeping military personnel on their accountabil-
ity (or lack thereof) for the abuse of civilians contrary to their duty under their respective mis-
sion to protect the said civilians. In light of this, it was established that the abuses of civilians 
by MONUSO and MINUSCA peacekeeping soldiers were very extensive and that the perpe-
trators were not adequately held accountable. This lack of accountability for the abuses is a 
result of the immunity granted to the peacekeeping soldiers, to the extent that the immunity (i) 
subjects the investigation to the legal systems of the TCC which are often inadequate, (ii) com-
promises the collection of evidence due to territorial barriers, and (iii) compromises the impar-
tiality of th~ process . These 3 factors make immunity problematic in holding peacekeeping 
soldiers accountable for their abuse of civilians. As hypothesized 153, the immunity granted to 
UN peacekeeping military personnel negatively affects their accountability for their abuse of 
civilians since whether they are held accountable depends entirely on the willingness and abil-
ity of the TCC to prosecute and investigate the abuses. 
It was established that MONUSCO and MINUSCA both have a primary mandate of protecting 
civilians from the use of force and thus are concerned with the human security concept. Human 
security seeks the protection of the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human 
freedoms and human fulfilment by protecting him/her from threats to his/her dignity. 154 This 
entails the protection of the fundamental freedoms of individuals from a variety of threats. For 
several years now, one of the threats to the dignity of individuals in the CAR and the DRC is 
the sexual exploitation and other abuse by peacekeeping troops working for the respective mis-
sion ' s.155 Protecting these individuals from this threat has thus become part of the mandate of 
these missions. Human security seeks to minimise the impact of threats on individuals by 
avoiding the actualisation of the threat. 156 As such, the two missions' mandate to protect civil-
ians from the threat posed by peacekeeping troops is best achieved by preventing these peace-
keeping troops from using violence against the civilians. Many sociologists argue that punish-
ment/accountability because of its deterrent effect is one of the best ways to prevent crime.157 
15 3 See page 3 
154 United Nations Human Security Unit, Human security in the01y and practice, 5. 
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Consequently, accountability for the use of force against civilians because of -its deterrent ef-
fect- is important in order to prevent the abuses and thus a necessary condition in assessing 
whether these missions have fulfilled their mandate to protect the civilians against the threat 
posed by the peacekeeping soldiers. Therefore, the failure to hold peacekeeping military per-
sonnel accountable for their abuse of civilians demonstrates that the two missions have failed 
to fulfil their respective mandates. This lack of accountability must be adequately addressed in 
order to justify the continuation of these missions. Consequently, the fact that the immunity · 
granted to peacekeeping soldiers fosters lack of accountability for their abuse of civilians can-
not be disregarded and must be addressed. 
On the other hand, the immunity granted to the peacekeeping military personnel is indispensa-
ble and without it ~eacekeeping would not be feasible because states- the only source of mil-
itary personnel for UN peacekeeping- would not contribute their soldiers. 158 As discussed, 
TCC's would most likely not participate in peacekeeping if they did not have exclusive juris-
diction over their soldiers, as doing so would potentially compromise the independence of their 
military and thus their sovereignty. 159 If this immunity was waived, states would withdraw their 
troops and peacekeeping would become impossible. On one hand the immunity makes the 
peacekeeping missions feasible and on other hand it renders the missions ineffective by foster-
ing lack of accountability. This is indeed a dilemma because waiving the immunity so as to 
enhance the effectiveness of the missions would render the missions impossible. MONUSCO 
and MINUSCA are necessary in order to ensure the safety of vulnerable civilians in the face 
of weak governments 160and they cannot be done away with. The immunity is a necessary evil 
because without MONUSCO and MINUSCA, the civilians in the DRC and the CAR would be 
vulnerable to insecurity posed by civil war and thus be in a worse position than they are now, 
even despite the abuse by peacekeeping soldiers. This means that any measures taken to foster 
accountability of the soldiers for abuse of civilians cannot include the waiver of the immunity. 
Instead, any such measure must examine and address the 3 factors that make immunity prob-
lematic in holding peacekeeping soldiers accountable for abuse of civilians. 
Some have suggested that the establishment of an international tribunal that would have the 
jurisdiction to try peacekeeping military personnel accused of abusing civilians would ensure 
158 See page 10-22. 
159 Hunter L, 'Should we prosecute the protectors? Holding peacekeepers accountable in cases of sexual exploi-
tation and abuse' I (I) Carleton Review of International Affairs, 2009, 19. 
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accountability. 161 However, this study found that such a tribunal most likely not be feasible as 
it would threaten the sovereignty of sending states in the same manner that waiving the im-
munity of the peacekeeping soldiers would. As such it could result in the withdrawal of troops 
by many TCC's. Even if it were feasible, it would face challenges similar to those being faced 
by the current system in ensuring accountability. Such a tribunal would not necessarily be im-
partial and its collection of evidence would be compromised by territorial barriers and political 
interests. 
Nevertheless, the proposal by the UN Secretary General to establishment of onsite court mar-
tials in the host state by each TCC to deal the allegations of sexual abuse of civilians against 
its military personnel 162, though not a perfect solution, would address the 3 factors that make 
the current system inefficient and thus is the most adequate way of ensuring that peacekeeping 
soldiers are adequately held accountable for their abuse of civilians. This would lift the terri-
torial barriers that compromise the collection of evidence and because court martials typically 
operate under specialised laws, all sending sates would be required to adequately legislate for 
the prosecution of peacekeeping soldiers who abuse civilians. 163 Thus the problem of inade-
quacy of laws would be solved. Moreover, a court martial would ensure that TCC's retain the 
exclusive jurisdiction over their military personnel and thus this is a feasible and sustainable 
solution. 
Because of the extensiveness and grotesque nature of the abuses of civilian's peacekeeping 
military personnel, especially in the DRC and the CAR, some human rights activists have 
called on the International Criminal court to prosecute the perpetrators of the abuse. 164 A study 
on the feasibility and legality of this proposal would be recommended, to determine whether 
the abuses and the peacekeeping military personnel fall under the jurisdiction of the ICC. 
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